Rajat Kumar v. S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha: Supreme Court rejects unprayed compensation

Ratio / rule laid down

A court cannot grant or impose a monetary remedy that was neither pleaded nor consented to, particularly by replacing an operative decree for mandatory injunction with compensation. Once the injunction decrees were set aside, the Executing Court had no decree under Order XXI of the Code authorising it to value the construction or distribute compensation.

Why this matters for lawyers

• Plead damages or compensation expressly where monetary relief is to be pursued; a court cannot create that relief as an alternative to the relief actually claimed.
• A decree for removal of an encroachment cannot be displaced merely because the construction is old or valuation is difficult, absent a legally sustainable basis and appropriate relief.
• An executing court cannot be directed to value property or award compensation after the underlying decree has been set aside; execution must remain anchored to an existing decree.
• In second appeals, counsel should insist that a genuine substantial question of law is framed and adjudicated. A reference to questions without treating them as substantial questions is insufficient.

Facts

Rajat Kumar and Others v. S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura and Others arose from two suits by Om Parkash. In Civil Suit No.426 of 1996, he sought removal of a wall allegedly erected by the defendants on common open space beyond his house and an injunction against further construction. The Trial Court decreed removal; the first Appellate Court affirmed it.

In Civil Suit No.148 of 2000, the Trial Court directed removal of a school-building lintel allegedly placed on the plaintiff’s wall and restrained any future placement. That decree too was affirmed on appeal. Neither suit sought damages or compensation.

Issues

• Whether the High Court could replace the decrees for mandatory injunction with directions to pay compensation and treat the wall as common, despite no claim for monetary relief.
• Whether the Executing Court could be directed to assess the value of the construction after the decrees in favour of the plaintiff had been set aside.
• Whether the High Court had properly exercised second-appeal jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code.

Court's Reasoning

The Supreme Court treated the suits as claims for removal of specific illegal constructions, not as claims for their monetary value. The Trial Court had found that the defendants failed to establish any right, title or interest in the land on which the wall stood; in the other suit, it found the lintel on the plaintiff’s wall to be illegal. Those findings supported the injunction decrees, which the first Appellate Court had upheld.

The absence of a prayer for damages or compensation was decisive. The High Court’s direction compelling the legal heirs to accept an amount assessed by a valuer altered the nature of the relief and did so without their consent. The Court also rejected the procedural route adopted: after setting aside the decrees, there was no decree capable of execution, so the Executing Court could not value the wall under Order XXI, CPC.

The Court further noted that an earlier attempt by the High Court to substitute compensation had already been set aside in the previous round because the merits had not been examined and substantial questions of law had not been framed. On remand, the High Court repeated the error, proceeded on the factually incorrect premise that the Trial Court had found the wall common, and did not show that its stated questions had been treated as substantial questions of law.

Key Takeaways

• A court cannot impose compensation where the plaint sought only mandatory or permanent injunction and the affected party did not consent.
• The relief granted must remain connected to the pleadings and the decree; equitable concerns cannot supply an entirely new monetary remedy.
• Execution proceedings cannot survive as an independent valuation or compensation process once the decree being executed has been set aside.
• In a second appeal, the High Court must identify and decide substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the Code.
• The matter was not finally decided on the merits of the encroachment; both second appeals must be reconsidered.

Important Observations

The Court characterised the High Court’s approach as a miscarriage of justice: the legal heirs were required to surrender decrees operating in their favour and accept monetary relief for which no prayer had been made. It also corrected the record on a material point—the Trial Court had ordered removal of the wall and had not declared it common.

What Remains Unresolved

The Supreme Court did not adjudicate the second appeals on their merits. The High Court must reconsider RSA Nos. 363 and 364 of 2008 in accordance with Section 100 of the Code and decide the issues on their own merits.

Source judgment: Rajat Kumar & Ors. v. S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha · Bench: S V N Bhatti, Atul S Chandurkar